Abstract. With the effective demise of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), state law is widely expected to play an expanded role in international human rights litigation. . . .
Although the United States Supreme Court instructs that a court reviewing agency decisions is required to consider any reliance interests that have been engendered, the high court has not always followed its own instruction. When the Supreme Court has considered reliance interests . . .
A storm is brewing on the corporate law horizon. Several recent judicial developments, which this Article ties together for the first time, present the most refined opportunity yet for mandatory arbitration—today prevalent in consumer and employment contracts—to enter the corporate law . . .
Nature, Nurture, or Neither?: Liability For Automated and Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Torts Based on Human Design and Influences
Legal scholars have proposed varying solutions to the question of who should be liable for harms caused by artificial intelligence (“AI”). The disagreement in AI-liability discourse stems from the lack of scope and definition on what AI is and what AI harms even look like.
“Ever since Congress overwhelmingly passed and President Benjamin Harrison signed the Sherman Act in 1890,” recounts the Supreme Court, “‘protecting consumers from monopoly prices’ has been ‘the central concern of antitrust.'”. . .
Courts have many interpretive tools to help construe statutory text that is found to be less than clear. One such tool is the rule of lenity. A typical formulation for the rule of lenity is that an ambiguous criminal statute should be strictly construed in favor of the criminal defendant . . .
If trials exist to develop truth, then jurors, as the final arbiters of that truth, should be allowed to ask clarifying questions of witnesses whose credibility they are judging. This procedural courtesy is not a recent phenomenon. Although still systemically underutilized and primarily . . .